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Remaking New York City: Can Prosperity Be Shared and Sustainable?
Abstract
Changes in the organization of global economic activity – in particular, the ascendance of services over
manufacturing in global cities – have had a profound impact on labor, consumer, and real estate markets in
New York City. New growth in service sectors has generated spectacular new wealth, and the city has firmly re-
established itself as a capital of commerce and culture, after being ravaged by disinvestment and fiscal crisis in
the 1960s and 70s. New York City's contemporary economy is a vibrant one in many ways, but it is also a
highly unequal one – one in which residents who are not part of the professional class (disproportionately
immigrants and people of color) face increasing challenges.
Mayor Michael Bloomberg's administration has wholeheartedly embraced the shift from an industrial to a
post-industrial economy, launching ground-level redevelopment strategies in over 20 neighborhoods (many
tied to the proposal for the 2012 Olympics), which add up to a transformation of the physical city. These plans
seek to open the city up for new commercial office and luxury housing development – through a mix of
rezonings, subsidies, and infrastructure investments in public transportation, open space, culture, and
spectacle. The public sector resources on which these plans lay claim are substantial – an estimated $20 billion
in capital spending. The development that would result from these plans offers many benefits for the city's
future, including new jobs, a higher capture rate of high-end commercial and residential users, increased tax
revenues, and enhanced public transportation and open space.
The Bloomberg vision for New York City's future is compelling in many respects: its focus on livability and
public space, its high design standards, its acknowledgement that adaptation to a largely post-industrial
economy is needed in land use planning, workforce development and economic development policy. But the
vision also implies several assumptions with which we disagree. First, it equates real estate development with
economic development. Second, it posits a future city that exists primarily for its most privileged residents,
with too few real benefits of growth reaching the less-wealthy 80% of the population.
The plans emanating from the current administration's bold vision for New York are likely to amplify the
inequalities embedded in the service-intensive economy and further drive up real estate values. As a result,
they will displace additional low-income housing (thus increasing segregation) and additional viable
manufacturing (thus reducing blue-collar job opportunities). Few corresponding gains (e.g. affordable
housing, living wage jobs) are being offered for low- or moderate-income families. In addition, the
environmental burdens of growth in an increasingly polarized city will continue to be borne
disproportionately by low-income communities of color.
Fortunately, the choice is not between inequitable growth and no growth. There are innovative strategies for
utilizing planning and redevelopment tools – without abandoning most of the current plans – not only to
generate prosperity, but to share it more equitably and to produce it more sustainably. Housing advocates,
community organizations, labor unions, business groups, environmental/environmental justice groups, and
advocacy/smart growth planners around the country are experimenting with new tools. Smartly applied, in
combination, many of these tools could reshape proposed redevelopment plans to create more shared and
sustainable prosperity in New York City.
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ABSTRACT
Changes in the organization of global economic activity – in particular, the ascendance of services over
manufacturing in global cities – have had a profound impact on labor, consumer, and real estate markets
in New York City.  New growth in service sectors has generated spectacular new wealth, and the city has
firmly re-established itself as a capital of commerce and culture, after being ravaged by disinvestment and
fiscal crisis in the 1960s and 70s. New York City’s contemporary economy is a vibrant one in many ways,
but it is also a highly unequal one – one in which residents who are not part of the professional class (dis-
proportionately immigrants and people of color) face increasing challenges.    
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration has wholeheartedly embraced the shift from an industrial to a
post-industrial economy, launching ground-level redevelopment strategies in over 20 neighborhoods (many
tied to the proposal for the 2012 Olympics), which add up to a transformation of the physical city.  These
plans seek to open the city up for new commercial office and luxury housing development – through a mix
of rezonings, subsidies, and infrastructure investments in public transportation, open space, culture, and
spectacle.  The public sector resources on which these plans lay claim are substantial – an estimated $20
billion in capital spending. The development that would result from these plans offers many benefits for the
city’s future, including new jobs, a higher capture rate of high-end commercial and residential users,
increased tax revenues, and enhanced public transportation and open space.
The Bloomberg vision for New York City’s future is compelling in many respects: its focus on livability and
public space, its high design standards, its acknowledgement that adaptation to a largely post-industrial
economy is needed in land use planning, workforce development and economic development policy.   But
the vision also implies several assumptions with which we disagree. First, it equates real estate development
with economic development. Second, it posits a future city that exists primarily for its most privileged res-
idents, with too few real benefits of growth reaching the less-wealthy 80% of the population.
The plans emanating from the current administration’s bold vision for New York are likely to amplify the
inequalities embedded in the service-intensive economy and further drive up real estate values.  As a result,
they will displace additional low-income housing (thus increasing segregation) and additional viable man-
ufacturing (thus reducing blue-collar job opportunities).  Few corresponding gains (e.g. affordable housing,
living wage jobs) are being offered for low- or moderate-income families.  In addition, the environmental
burdens of growth in an increasingly polarized city will continue to be borne disproportionately by low-
income communities of color.
Fortunately, the choice is not between inequitable growth and no growth.  There are innovative strategies
for utilizing planning and redevelopment tools – without abandoning most of the current plans – not only
to generate prosperity, but to share it more equitably and to produce it more sustainably.  Housing advo-
cates, community organizations, labor unions, business groups, environmental/environmental justice
groups, and advocacy/smart growth planners around the country are experimenting with new tools.
Smartly applied, in combination, many of these tools could reshape proposed redevelopment plans to cre-
ate more shared and sustainable prosperity in New York City.
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I.  CONTEXT:  THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF NEW YORK CITY
Through the 1960s and 1970s, in a well-known story, New York City experienced a dramatic decline, as
manufacturing declined precipitously, business decentralized, middle-class white families moved to the
suburbs, sprawling suburban development became the norm, and many of the city’s neighborhoods were
abandoned. 
DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION
First, even more markedly than in the nation as a whole, employment related to the production and distri-
bution of goods has declined. In 1947, the city’s 37,000 manufacturing establishments employed close to
a million workers in the city;1 beginning in about 1960, that number dropped by hundreds of thousands of
workers each decade. The reasons were many: a combination of rising automation and productivity, a
switch to truck transport that freed producers from locations near rail, competition from low-cost regions
within the U.S. and overseas, and the decline of the city’s port-related industry, prompted by containeriza-
tion and the shift of shipping activity to the Port of New Jersey. By 1980, manufacturing jobs numbered just
slightly over half of what they had been in 1947. Industry also declined as a proportion of total employ-
ment, from 28% in 1950 to just 7% in 1999.  
NEIGHBORHOOD ABANDONMENT
A combination of job loss, urban unrest, public and private disinvestment, federal subsidies for suburban
migration, and the real estate practice known as block-busting2 led in the 1960s and 70s to the exodus from
New York of hundreds of thousands of middle- and working-class families. The construction of the interstate
highway system, which brought $123 billion of federal infrastructure investment to local regions, is a good
example of the “double whammy” effect of many federal policies; while encouraging middle-class flight,
highways often devastated inner-city neighborhoods, reducing property values and cutting residents off
from open space, community business districts, and one another. As federal programs like the G.I. bill and
innovations in mortgage lending led to a housing boom in the region’s outer ring, thousands of buildings in
neighborhoods like the South Bronx and East New York in Brooklyn were abandoned, and people who
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1 See Joshua Freeman, Working Class New York, The New Press, 2000
2 Realtors and speculators, invoking the specter of deterioration and crime, would scare middle-class, primarily white
families into selling their homes for a fraction of their worth and moving out of the city; they would then sell the prop-
erties to low-income owners of color (who because of restrictive covenants and exclusionary zoning had far fewer res-
idential options) at inflated prices, collaborating with mortgage companies that charged exorbitant interest. Because
this arrangement often led to default, “the white middle class learned to associate the presence of blacks with residen-
tial decline” (Dennis Judd and Todd Swanstrom, City Politics, Addison-Wesley 2002, Ch.7)
remained in those communities faced deterioration in their schools, parks, physical infrastructure and san-
itation services. Communities responded by establishing grassroots local development organizations, but
the toil and protest of local leaders initially could do little to counter the tide of disinvestment. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND SPRAWL
As the center city “hollowed out,” jobs followed population (from 1970 to 1995, core urban counties lost
more than 300,000 jobs while the outer suburban ring gained 2 million)3 and property investors built cam-
pus-style commercial and industrial facilities in sprawling suburbs which had only recently been forest or
farmland. This not only left physical and human infrastructure in the city underutilized and drove the city
to fiscal insolvency, but caused serious environmental problems as well: worsening air and water quality,
the paving of wildlife habitat and natural resources, and mounting dependence on fossil fuel as vehicle
miles traveled increased over 60%.4
NEAR ABANDONMENT, AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES AND PHILOSOPHIES
On the federal level, our leaders have abandoned redistributive policies that have been in place for New
Yorkers since the New Deal. The withdrawal of federal housing subsidies, cuts in health care, childcare and
public education, and a seeming indifference to the growing ranks of working poor suggest that more than
ever before, New York City and New York State are “on their own” to make difficult choices about how to
provide basic support and economic opportunity to low-income families living in one of the most expen-
sive cities in the country. This occurs at a time when the real value of the minimum wage has declined by
close to 30% since 1974.5 Though economists argue that the national level is the appropriate level on
which to use government’s power to redistribute wealth (because it is less distorting of residential and busi-
ness location choices), it became clear in the 1980s and 90s that redistribution, if it is to take place at all,
will fall increasingly to New York City and State at least in the short term. 
Yet despite these deep negative trends, New York City (like several other so-called “global cities”) has by
many measures experienced a remarkable comeback. One component of the resurgence began in the
1980s – the rise of finance, business services, and cultural production as key elements of the city’s econom-
ic base. Other trends, such as escalating land prices and a rising population, did not become fully evident
until the 1990s. These elements of the city’s resurgence are discussed below.
REMAKING NEW YORK CITY: CAN PROSPERITY BE SHARED AND SUSTAINABLE? 3
3 Regional Plan Association, A Region at Risk: A Summary of the Third Regional Plan for the New York-New Jersey-
Connecticut Metropolitan Area, 1996.
4 Ibid.
5 See Appelbaum, Bernhardt and Murnane, eds. Low-Wage America. Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.
THE RISE OF A SERVICE AND ENTERTAINMENT ECONOMY
While it was unclear in the late 1970s whether new economic drivers would emerge to replace lost indus-
trial and office employment in New York City, the increasing globalization of economic activity in the 1980s
turned out to have a beneficial impact on New York. Even as firms decentralized the production of goods
to far-flung locations across the globe, they sought the sophisticated services they needed (banking, legal
services, advertising) in central locations that could provide a large pool of skilled workers and the oppor-
tunity for the frequent face-to-face contact that characterizes complex transactions. Firms also centralized
management functions, and both business and leisure travel escalated.6 New jobs in financial and business
services offset losses in the traditional economic base, as did jobs in the expanding tourism and culture
industries and (with the infusion of new wealth) employment in personal service establishments like spas,
gyms and restaurants. While many noticed that the employment structure of the post-industrial city was
highly polarized, with jobs clustered at the top and the bottom of the income distribution and attrition in
traditional middle-class work, proposed solutions tended to focus on improving educational opportunities
so that more of the population could participate in the “knowledge economy.” 
IN-MIGRATION
Both the top and bottom tiers of service jobs tend to have been filled by new residents to the city – afflu-
ent migrants (members of Richard Florida’s “creative class”) on the one hand and poor immigrants, prima-
rily from outside the U.S., on the other. While white middle-class families continued to leave New York City
for the suburbs (the city lost more than 300,000 whites in the 1990s), this was more than offset by a strong
influx of Hispanic, Caribbean, and Asian immigrants concentrated in Brooklyn, the Bronx, and especially
Queens. Another migration trend is embodied in the growing appeal of New York living for a generation of
affluent people, many raised in the suburbs. The professional class is returning to (or remaining in) New
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Accounts data
*Does not sum to 100 because agriculture, mining, and government employment are not included.
Employment by Sector in New York City, 1969-1999
6 See Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. (Princeton University Press 1991).
York City: there were close to 325,000 more New York residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher in New
York City in 2000 than there were in 1990.7 Both kinds of in-migrants have enabled New York to defy a
national trend of declining central-city income and population.8
REVITALIZATION OF ONCE-DEVASTATED NEIGHBORHOODS
Communities scorched by abandonment and arson in the 1960s and 70s have seen new residential and
retail development in the last decade. Immigrant entrepreneurs have often stimulated these changes:
Caribbean-Americans in East Flatbush and Jamaica, Latinos in Cypress Hills and the South Bronx, East
Asians in Flushing and Dominicans in Washington Heights. In other cases, development has been driven
by Manhattan residents’ and affluent newcomers’ “discovery” of charming surroundings and low rents in
neighborhoods like Williamsburg, Carroll Gardens and Harlem. Also driving the record number of housing
permits and new retail establishments is the extraordinary work of non-profit community development cor-
porations (CDCs) founded in the 1960s and 70s as grassroots protest groups but now characterized by
increasing development acumen and financial savvy. CDCs have successfully leveraged public investment
such as Mayor Edward Koch’s 10-year housing capital plan at the local level and the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit and New Markets tax credit at the federal level. While engaged in housing and business devel-
opment, CDCs have also fought the City to prevent discriminatory siting policies that concentrate noxious
uses like waste transfer stations in low-income neighborhoods and to ensure that their communities bene-
fit from public investments in open space and other amenities. 
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Ethnic Composition of New York City, 1980 and 2000
7 U.S. Bureau of the Census STF 3 1990, 2000.
8 New York City’s population rose in the 1990s by 456,000 people to just over 8 million, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau. However, some suggest that because of previous undercounting, the growth of the 1990s was not quite as
astronomical as portrayed. See Andrew Beveridge, “Eight Million New Yorkers!” Gotham Gazette, March 2001.
While observers of urban economies have been debating about the emergence of the post-industrial city
for decades, the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg is the first to focus its economic development
and urban planning policy around it.  The administration came into office proposing to address issues of
economic growth and development in a way that departs significantly from its predecessors.  Led by Deputy
Mayor for Economic Development and Rebuilding, Daniel Doctoroff, the administration indicated that it
would not focus on providing tax breaks and direct financial incentives to large corporations to persuade
them to locate in New York City.  Instead, they have focused on a strategy of property-led economic devel-
opment; that is, they have focused on providing space – primarily office space – for the type of economic
growth (i.e. professional and managerial jobs, in an array of professional service sectors) which they hope
and believe can take place in New York city in the years to come.
They have approached this goal through a remarkable array of neighborhood-specific redevelopment and
rezoning plans.  While many are linked through the NYC 2012 plan for an Olympics in New York City, they
are not informed by a conventional “master plan.”  Instead, they take the form of more than 20 area-spe-
cific plans, which include rezoning actions and infrastructure investments.  When added together, howev-
er, they are likely to change the face of the city for generations to come.  As Professor Michael Schill says,
“Every now and then you get a period when you say the face of the city may be changed forever.”10
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“The Bloomberg Administration recog-
nized a basic fact of the modern economy,
the transition from a large significantly
industrial economy to a postindustrial
economy.”
- Deputy Mayor Daniel L. Doctoroff9
II. DEVELOPMENT VISIONS
9 Quoted in Barbanel, Josh, “Remaking, or Preserving, the City’s Face,” The New York Times, January 18, 2004.
10 Ibid.
A Triumphant Image of Manhattan’s Far West Side
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The plans generally fall into one of four broad categories:11
1. Converting areas currently zoned for manufacturing into a mix of office and residential development.
2. Expanding development opportunities in central business districts throughout the city, with an empha-
sis on commercial office space, but also including additional residential, transportation, and open space
development to encourage a 24-hour community and attract businesses. 
3. Establishing "contextual rezoning" in neighborhoods facing market pressure but deemed appropriate for
additional housing, by establishing height limits on residential row house  side streets, while allowing
for additional density on wide avenues and near transit hubs.
4. Downzoning (i.e. limiting development) in  other residential  neighborhoods, where residents are con-
cerned about overdevelopment.
11 This typology was suggested by Josh Barbanel, ibid.  The chart is from Kalima Rose, Brad Lander, and Karoleen
Feng, Increasing Housing Opportunity in New York City: The Case for Inclusionary Zoning, PolicyLink and Pratt, 2004.
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New York City Proposed Zoning Changes, 2003-2004
Out-of-scale development in Park Slope, Brooklyn
Downzoning for Staten Island
It is worth pausing briefly on this last category – downzonings
to “preserve neighborhood character” by preventing develop-
ment that is out of scale with existing neighborhood build-
ings.  These actions are taking place primarily in neighbor-
hoods occupied by white homeowners.  Developers in these
communities are responding to market demand for addition-
al density, in many cases building either rental housing or
attached townhouses at a larger scale than existing buildings.
In all of the Bloomberg Administration’s urban plans, this is
the one area that explicitly aims to close, rather than to open.
The goal here is to prevent development, and in this case it is
development that is often creating more affordable housing
for immigrants and lower-income families in “neighborhoods
of choice.”  In these neighborhoods, Bloomberg’s
Department of City Planning is willing to use the regulatory
zoning power to support a social and political goal of closing
down.  Unfortunately, as we will see, while they frequently
use these tools for opening other areas up to market rate
development, they are not generally willing to utilize these
tools for opening areas up with an explicit equity component.
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NYC Redevelopment Initiatives (2003-2005)12
12 Compiled by authors from the scopes of work for the environmental impact statements for these projects prepared
by or for the Department of City Planning and other public information about these projects.
And all of this is in addition to an array of tax incentives and abatements which already existed to encour-
age property-led economic development.  Most new residential developments pay no property taxes for 15-
20 years, through the “421-a” tax abatement program.  In core Manhattan, this tax break requires that
developers include affordable housing; elsewhere, however (including lower Manhattan and the now-toney
neighborhoods of Brooklyn) developers receive 15-year abatements even for market-rate housing construc-
tion.  For commercial development, most developers are eligible to receive a 12-20 year tax abatement
through the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program, as well as a discount on energy costs.
As noted above, many of these plans – especially Hudson Yards and the extension of the 7 train – but also
a substantial number of new athletic facilities, open spaces, and some infrastructure investments – are tied
to the City’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games.  The City and NYC2012 have made this “Olympic legacy”
one of the key selling-points for the games.  However, while hosting the Olympics would certainly accel-
erate construction (the Olympics is sometimes referred to as 50 years of capital investment in seven years),
and while some athletic facilities will only be built if the city wins the Olympics (archery fields and the
velodrome are not otherwise in the City’s capital plan), the majority of these redevelopment plans are slat-
ed to move forward whether or not the Olympics take place here. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLOOMBERG PLAN
The envisioned transformation of New York City under the Bloomberg Administration’s plan would feature
a host of public benefits. Foremost among them is the creation of new recreational and open space along
the East, Hudson and Bronx Rivers, on the site of the former Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island, and at
Flushing Meadows Park and Jamaica Bay in Queens. The city’s waterfront, rezoned and redeveloped with
market-rate housing and publicly accessible greenway, would offer leisure and recreation opportunities to
residents, including those in some low-income communities who are now cut off from their neighborhoods’
shorelines. The image of derelict East River piers transformed into riverfront recreation centers is essential
to the chic urban image surrounding New York City’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games, and the thought of
a major league basketball team in Brooklyn has many borough residents cheering.  
A second benefit would be jobs, especially the short-term construction work associated with projected cap-
ital outlays - 18,000 construction jobs on the Far West Side, 15,000 to build the Nets Arena Complex,
10,000 for Lower Manhattan redevelopment, thousands more to build market-rate housing. Longer-term,
there would be permanent jobs in office buildings, retail establishments and hotels.  
Third, New Yorkers post-transformation will have many more shopping and dining options, from Target and
Red Lobster in downtown Brooklyn to the funky boutiques and gourmet food shops slated for tonier resi-
dential enclaves. As Planning Commission Chair Amanda Burden emphasizes, the urban design master
plans that accompany major rezoning and redevelopment initiatives would help ensure that new construc-
tion is compatible with each neighborhood’s “sense of place” and with high design standards.13
Proposed Willoughby Square in 
Downtown Brooklyn
Finally, the plan, if successful, would retain and attract more
high-earning residents (in the outer boroughs as well as
Manhattan) who would likely otherwise live in the suburbs,
bring office tenants to the city who would otherwise have
chosen Westchester and New Jersey locations, and generate
the property, sales and income tax revenues associated with
all of the additional people and jobs. 
But these benefits come at a high public cost.  Perhaps more
significant, they are not at all well-shared – by income/class,
by race, or by geography. The Bloomberg Administration, in
its effort to strengthen the office economy and draw in the
“creative class,” ignores opportunities to use development to
benefit the city’s working-class and middle- and low-income
residents, especially in neighborhoods of color. The water-
front esplanades and glittering towers of the city’s current
13 Amanda Burden, speech at Crain’s breakfast forum, November 6, 2003.
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plan represent a vision for the future that offers too little to New Yorkers who are struggling with the social
and economic trends described below. 
CONTINUING CRISIS IN LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING
Another result of New York City’s resurgence as a service-oriented city is a severe housing crisis, in the city
and throughout the region.  As Mayor Bloomberg has said, “we are now the victims of our own success.”14
Housing is increasingly unaffordable to a wide range of New Yorkers.  Average rents in New York City
(adjusted for inflation) grew 33% from 1975-1999; average renter incomes grew just 3%.15 More than
500,000 families pay over 50% of their income in rent – and 286,000 of these households have incomes
less than $17,700 and receive no subsidies.16 The rental vacancy rate in 2002 for units renting for $500 -
$700, the vacancy rate was 1.42%.  In addition, there was a 34% increase in the number of families expe-
riencing severe crowding (i.e. >1.5 persons per room) just from 1999 to 2002, and there are estimated to
be 100,000 households living in illegal basements or garages.
In the metropolitan region, more than 75% of households earning less than $20,000 pay more than 35%
of their income for rents, and 40% of moderate income households in the suburbs lack adequate housing.
New Yorkers have the longest commute times in the country.17 This is a particular hardship for women and
families at all incomes – with both middle-class women struggling to balance work and home, and losing
ever-increasing time to their commutes, often leading to lower-income caring for their children or homes,
who in turn lose both the time of their employers’ commutes and their own.  
The Bloomberg rezonings are projected to lead to more than 40,000 units of housing in the next 10 years,
and more than 80,000 in total.18 The vast majority of these units are in high rent areas (e.g. Greenpoint-
Williamsburg, West Chelsea, the Far West Side, Lower Manhattan), where market rents exceed $2,000 and
sales prices range from $500,000 to $3 million.  
The Bloomberg Administration suggests that developers will opt to use “New Housing Marketplace” pro-
grams to create affordable housing.  However, there is little evidence to suggest that this is true.  Instead,
substantial recent evidence suggests that the vast majority of this housing will be market-rate, luxury hous-
ing – far out of reach for average New Yorkers.  All told, we estimate that fewer than 8% of the total units
14 Mayor Michael Bloomberg, speech at Enterprise Foundation Network Conference, October 14, 2004.
15 Markee, Patrick et al (2002),  Housing a Growing City: New York’s Bust in Boom Times, Coalition for the Homeless.
16 Statistics compiled from Housing First!, www.housingfirst.net. 
17 Regional Plan Association and Citizens Housing and Planning Commission, Out of Balance: The Housing Crisis
from a Regional Perspsective. April 2004.
18 Unit counts were taken, where available from official documents available from the NYC Department of City
Planning (scoping documents, environmental impact statements, official public statements, etc.).
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created by these rezoning and redevelopment actions will be affordable. Outside of the midtown
Manhattan, we estimate that fewer than 5% of the units will be affordable to low, moderate, or even mid-
dle-income families. 19
Moreover, as neighborhoods are redeveloped and rents rise, more residents will be pushed out.  While sec-
ondary displacement is notoriously difficult to predict, it is clear that housing prices will rise dramatically
faster than the incomes of current residents, as neighborhoods are redeveloped to be more attractive for lux-
ury housing.  In Greenpoint-Williamsburg alone, the NYC Department of City Planning itself estimates that
over 2,500 tenants will be secondarily displaced,20 and neighborhood organizations believe this is sub-
stantially underestimated.
PREVENTABLE DECLINE IN INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT
In 2000, about 252,000 manufacturing jobs remained in New York City. While this is a large number (only
a few central cities house more than 250,000 jobs of any kind), it represents a steep absolute and propor-
tional decline – the transformation of New York into a “post-industrial” city.  Today, a job in services or retail
is a much more realistic goal for a non-college-bound 18-year-old than a position in a factory or distribu-
tion center. For a host of reasons, however, industry should not be written off. A 2003 study conducted for
the Economic Development Corporation by Boston’s Parthenon Group concluded that despite the growing
dominance of services, the city’s industrial base has the potential to stabilize and even grow slightly in some
specialized sectors.21
But over the course of the 1990s, city officials provided lax enforcement of zoning and building codes, tol-
erated the illegal conversion of buildings in manufacturing zones, and granted zoning variances to devel-
opers who sought to convert industrial buildings to higher-yielding uses, even in cases where they still con-
tained industrial tenants. The resulting climate of uncertainty helped send real estate prices skyrocketing in
mixed-use neighborhoods and created serious problems for firms like the Brooklyn Brewery and Won Ton
Foods whose owners had hoped to expand.22 Many industrial jobs in New York have been lost to global
economic forces, but local inaction has also played a role. The Bloomberg administration’s current plans do
nothing to address land use uncertainty and lack of affordable space for industrial companies. While City
officials enthusiastically reach into public coffers to dispense capital and operating subsidies to develop-
19 Assumptions and rationale for these assumptions are provided in Rose, Kalima; Lander, Brad; and Feng, Karoleen
(2004), Increasing Housing Opportunity in New York City: The Case for Inclusionary Zoning, PolicyLink and Pratt,
Appendix A, p. 42.
20 NYC Department of City Planning (2004), Greenpoint-Williamsburg Rezoning Environmental Impact Statement,
Chapter 3.. 
21 The Parthenon Group, “New York City Industrial Sector Recommendations,” August 2003.
22 See Tina Traster, “Hot Brooklyn Properties Put a Freeze on Industry.” Crains New York Business. May 12, 2003.
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ment initiatives and individual firms in the FIRE, retail and related services sectors, they have foregone
opportunities to formulate even basic policy around the city’s remaining – and potentially vibrant – indus-
trial sector. 
IMBALANCED ECONOMIC BASE
The continuing loss of industrial jobs is of concern in part because the city’s hegemonic position as the
region’s business and financial center is under threat. While gains in finance and business services (FBS)
employment were a significant factor in the city’s recovery from the recession of the mid-1970s, these jobs
declined in the 1990s, and in the securities industry, considered crucial to the economy because of the high
incomes earned by its employees, employment barely grew between 1990 and 2002.23 Thus, despite the
continuing vitality of the city’s office markets (and despite plans to create as much as 68 million new square
feet of office space), the once-unquestioned dominance of New York as a financial and corporate services
capital is in doubt, especially since the massive corporate relocation that followed the 2001 terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center. 
Hunters Point and Long Island City in western Queens
Policy analysts have urged the City to spend less energy and money retaining large FBS firms and more on
supporting small businesses and enabling entrepreneurship. But the Administration’s property-led develop-
ment philosophy is largely incompatible with this strategy, and the City continues to provide enormous sub-
sidies to large corporations to prevent them from leaving the city and to dedicate insufficient resources to
smaller, more moderately profitable firms. The impact of this is a highly imbalanced economic base and an
increasing dependence on the volatile financial sector for city revenue and personal income. 
23 See Jonathan Bowles and Joel Kotkin, Engine Failure, Center for an Urban Future, 2003. Professional and business
services firms and are decentralizing to regional satellite cities like Jersey City, New Jersey, Stamford, Connecticut and
White Plains, New York. Corporate headquarters have left central-city New York; the city had only 39 headquarters in
2002 compared to 77 in 1979.
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INCOME POLARIZATION AND POVERTY
While recent trends have brought much-needed new people and new wealth into New York City, they have
also resulted in a more polarized and segregated city. Total annual personal income in the city grew from
182 to 278 billion dollars during the decade, and large income gains among Manhattan residents pushed
the city’s average income up by 20%, but median income across the city declined.24 One million seven
hundred thousand people in New York City (20.5%) lived below the federal poverty threshold in 2002 (up
from about 19% in 1990). Notes Mark Levitan of the Community Service Society, 
If they resided in their own municipality, New York’s poor would constitute the fifth largest city
in the United States; only Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and the rest of New York would have
a larger population.25
If New York mirrors the nation, 63% of those poor families have one or more workers, underscoring the
enormous challenge of earning a family-supporting income at a low-wage job.26
24 See Andrew Beveridge, “The Boom 1990’s?” Gotham Gazette April 2002.
25 Mark Levitan, “Poverty 2002:  One-Fifth of the City Lives Below the Federal Poverty Line.” Community Service
Society, September 2003.
26 See Michelle Conlin and Aaron Bernstein, “Working and Poor,” Business Week Cover Story, May 31, 2004.
27 Fiscal Policy Institute, State of Working New York 2001: Working Harder, Growing Apart.
Growing Inequality in NYC:  Inflation Adjusted Incomes, Late 1970s to Late 1990s27
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LACK OF SUFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION AND “SECOND-CHANCE” EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS;
POOR MANAGEMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES
In a services-dominated economy, many jobs which enable families to be economically self-sufficient
require more training and preparation than they did in the past. The earning power of people without col-
lege degrees declined from the 1970s and the late 1990s,28 and in 2003, the unemployment rate among
New Yorkers lacking high school degrees was 11.2 percent, as compared to a city-wide rate of 8.5 per-
cent.29 For those whose lack of basic skills or college credentials hinders labor market success, policy mak-
ers emphasize the importance of education and training, and the Bloomberg Administration has dedicated
much energy and political capital to a re-engineering of the city’s distressed K-12 system. 
At the same time, city and state cuts have made public higher education increasingly expensive. At the City
University of New York, annual tuition is now $4,000 at four-year schools and $2,800 at community col-
leges. SUNY tuition is $4,350 annually. And the federal Pell grant program covers just 40% of tuition cost
today as opposed to 84% in 1972. Meanwhile, federal funding for “second-chance” programs – investments
to train and retrain low-skilled workers – plunged from $24 billion in 1978 to just over $6 billion in 2000,
with corresponding declines at the New York City level. 
Beyond a need for additional investment, there is consensus that the local workforce system in New York
City, like many local workforce systems, is broken and badly in need of reform, due to its high level of dis-
organization, a poor reputation among employers and unsatisfactory past performance in helping New
Yorkers prepare for, get and keep good jobs. The Bloomberg Administration recently disbanded the city’s
Department of Employment and created a new space for workforce programs within the Department of
Small Business Services, a bold move which has encouraged many observers.30
INCOME AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION
Income and ethnic segregation are not necessarily negative, since they to some extent represent choices
made by individuals to live in communities where they will benefit from strong social and cultural net-
works.  Unfortunately, however, poverty has remained concentrated as income disparities have
increased31.  In addition, despite this geographic concentration, elected political representation lags about
28 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, The State of Working America 1996-97, Economic Policy
Institute 1997.
29 Mark Levitan, “A Crisis of Black Male Employment: Unemployment and Joblessness in New York City 2003,”
Community Service Society, February 2004.
30 David Jason Fischer, Center for An Urban Future, Remarks to City Council: Workforce System in Transition,
September 16, 2003.
31 Regional Plan Association and Citizens Housing and Planning Commission, Out of Balance: The Housing Crisis
from a Regional Perspective. April 2004.
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20 years behind newcomers share of the population, and NYC is the only city of largest 30 in which the
school system is increasingly segregated over the past 20 years.32
LACK OF INVESTMENT IN QUALITY OF LIFE IN COMMUNITIES WHERE HIGH-END DEVELOPMENT IS NOT PLANNED
The need for streets, waterfronts, and other public spaces that are healthful and safe for walking and cycling
is particularly urgent in low-income communities. So is the need for improved transport infrastructure –
poor residents on Manhattan’s East Side, for example, have been awaiting a 2nd Avenue Subway line for
decades. But the Administration’s plans for parks and recreational facilities, and for transportation improve-
ments, are linked to their plans to stimulate high-end commercial development and luxury housing. Thus,
they focus on low-income neighborhoods only rarely, and in those cases only incidentally (for example,
Greenpoint and Williamsburg will have a renewed waterfront as a result of proposed development initia-
tives, but the average rent of new housing units is projected to be $2,500 - $3,000/month.
Persistently high rates of segregation shape neighborhood change in New York City
32 John Logan and John Mollenkopf, People and Politics in America’s Big Cities, Drum Major Institute, 2003.
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CONTINUED CONCENTRATION OF NOXIOUS LAND USES IN LOWER-INCOME COMMUNITIES.
The City has not planned sufficiently to bear the environmental costs of planned new development.  Plans
for the World Trade Center site, for example, while incorporating more sustainable building materials and
some energy improvements, do not fully consider the implications of the new energy needed and the new
waste to be generated.  As a result, the burdens will most likely fall on low-income communities of color
that already bear the past legacy of environmental racism (e.g. the building of Battery Park City led to the
need for a new waste treatment plant on the West Harlem waterfront).  Earlier this year, West Harlem
Environmental Action criticized the plan for the stadium and Far West Side development, arguing that it
would have “potentially disastrous environmental consequences”33
Solid Waste Transfer in New York City
33 WEACT press release, “West Side Stadium Development Plan To Create Potential Sewage And Environmental
Nightmare For Harlem, The Hudson River And The West Side Of Manhattan,” July 23, 2004.
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And while the City has embraced billions of dollars in new plans for transit improvements that would bring
professionals and service workers to and from their jobs in Manhattan (7 train extension, Second Avenue
Subway, one seat ride to Kennedy Airport from Lower Manhattan, East Side Access on the Long Island Rail
Road to Grand Central Station), they have thus far been cold to the proposal to construct a rail freight tun-
nel between New Jersey and New York – perhaps the only step that could meaningfully reduce freight truck
traffic on the region’s roadways and thus reduce asthma-causing emissions.  While a study commissioned
by the City’s Economic Development Corporation indicates that the freight tunnel is essential for the region,
the Bloomberg Administration has not pledged its support.
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
It is also important to bear in mind that the particular development choices being made have opportunity
costs. Capital dollars invested in infrastructure that supports Class A office and market-rate housing devel-
opment will not perform school renovations or contribute to the development of middle- or low-income
housing units.34 Parks built at the waterfront, flanked by luxury residential towers, depend on dollars that
will not be spent on recreational facilities in less expensive neighborhoods.  City operating funds dedicat-
ed to repaying interest on Hudson Yards debt35 or coaxing Met Life to Long Island City cannot be spent
improving city services to small businesses or educating low-earning New Yorkers’ children for jobs that pay
better than those their parents had. According to urban scholar Susan Fainstein, “The property-led strategy
for economic development has meant that public resources that might have been used elsewhere became
embedded in real estate.”36
Additionally, the speculation and appreciating real estate prices that will almost certainly accompany city-
subsidized real estate development will drive low-rent land users (not only industrial businesses, but also
not-for-profit groups, small retailers and arts organizations) from neighborhoods as they improve. While
public intervention may be intended to prevent high land prices from making it impossible for developers
to develop and for businesses to locate in the city, it is also likely to inflame property speculation and con-
tribute to displacement, shortage of affordable housing units and, ultimately, oversupply of luxury residen-
tial and commercial space if demand fails to materialize as projected. The social costs associated with city
subsidy of “boom and bust” cycles in the real estate market are steep. 
34 For example, the City originally proposed to finance the expansion of the Javits Convention Center using bonds
backed by the revenues of the Battery Park City Authority. BPCA revenues had originally been committed to finance
the development of low-cost housing, but a succession of mayors has used a loophole to subvert this obligation.
35 While the City claims that infrastructure costs will be borne by new tax revenue from new development, most ana-
lysts of the financing proposal believe that the City will need to use its general obligation funds to guarantee debt. For
example, interest on bonds issued for infrastructure under the Hudson Yards plan will purportedly be covered by
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs) by developers, but individuals knowledgeable about public finance suggest that
these bonds will need to be guaranteed by the City’s own credit in order to attract buyers. Further, the City will have
to pay an estimated $1 billion interest on the bonds during a 12-year construction period.
36 Susan S. Fainstein, The City-Builders: Property Development in New York and London 1980-2000 (University Press
of Kansas 2001), p. 77. 
The Bloomberg vision for New York City’s future is compelling in many respects: its focus on livability and
public space, its high design standards, its acknowledgement that adaptation to a largely post-industrial
economy is needed in land use planning, workforce development and economic development policy.   But
the vision also implies several assumptions with which we disagree. First, it equates real estate development
with economic development. Second, it posits a future city that exists almost entirely for its most privileged
residents, with fewer real benefits of growth reaching the less-wealthy 80% of the population. 
IV. WHAT “GROWTH WITH EQUITY” MIGHT LOOK LIKE
Fortunately, the choice is not between growth and no growth.  We are eager to see economic development,
growth, and prosperity generated – but also to see it shared more equally.  We much prefer to see an indi-
vidual working on Wall Street and living on the Greenpoint waterfront, rather than working across the river
in Jersey City and living in a suburb in Connecticut.  It makes more sense from a smart growth perspective,
it helps boost the city’s tax base (especially since New York City taxes more progressively than its neigh-
bors), and it generates economic activity and the region’s core.  We are not calling for a vain attempt to
return to the 1950s, or to revive use of the Erie Canal.
However, we believe it is economically feasible, environmentally necessary, and politically smart to share
the benefits and costs of development more evenly.  If we are embracing forms of growth which amplify
inequality – if we undertake polices that accelerate the loss of blue-collar manufacturing jobs and their
replacement by a two-tier service economy – we are obligated to find ways to address the inequities and
burdens that result from these trends.
The good news, we believe, is that the city can do so.  While many factors within New York City’s growing
service economy drive toward inequality, there are several factors which – if leveraged thoughtfully – can
push instead toward the type of shared and sustainable prosperity we hope to see.  These include:
A substantial set of businesses, cultural institutions, and related actors want to be located in New York
City and are willing to pay some premium to do so. While many economic activities can be outsourced,
much of the strength in the NYC economy is that high “value-added” actors want to be located here.
Mayor Bloomberg has repeatedly noted this, presenting as a reason why many business and individu-
als remain in NYC despite its various burdens.  It is clear that many actors in FIRE (finance, insurance,
and real estate), media, and what NYU President John Sexton has tagged ICE (intellectual, cultural, and
educational institutions) are firmly rooted in New York City.
Specialty production of goods and services thrives in New York City.  Because of the high-end business-
es that want to make NYC their home, a meaningful subsection of economic activity makes sense here
to serve those markets (e.g. high-end furniture and other craft production, the fashion and printing
industries, etc).  
High-income gentrification is labor-intensive, whereas middle-income suburbanization is capital inten-
sive. Highway construction and the creation of tract housing and shopping centers rely on mass pro-
duction, whereas the retrofitting of existing infrastructure and building stock requires a larger amount
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of skilled and craft labor. High-earning college-educated residents are often willing to pay a premium
for specialty food, child care, high-end personal services and custom goods. The question is how to
ensure that labor retains a portion of that price premium for value added. 
The retrofitting of the city’s infrastructure presents opportunities for environmental quality improvements
and job creation.  Mayor Bloomberg has rightly noted that “Sustainable development is crucial to New
York City’s future. Creating new buildings, retrofitting old ones to be more energy efficient and incor-
porating new technologies that are less expensive and environmentally friendly is vital for the contin-
ued growth of our City.”37 Because so much of the city’s building stock is older, there are substantial
opportunities to retrofit in order to improve energy efficiency and reducing waste – in ways which can
create jobs and drive product innovation.
The rootedness of key global processes in New York City provides an opportunity for new, smart, spa-
tially-concentrated regulatory activity. As Saskia Sassen has written, “the … transnational grid of places
and linkages that constitute the infrastructure for the globalization of finance and other specialized serv-
ices points to regulatory possibilities.  Precisely because of its strategic character and become of the
density of resources and linkages it concentrates, this new geography of centrality could in turn be a
space for concentrated regulatory activity.”38
Building upon these factors, there are innovative strategies that utilize planning and redevelopment tools
with which NYC policymakers could seek – without abandoning most of the current plans – not only to
generate prosperity, but to share it more equitably and to produce it more sustainably.  
One model for such redevelopment is Barcelona, which used the 1992 Olympics precisely for this type of
transformation.  Like New York City, Barcelona planners sought to use the Games to convert their land uses
from an industrial city to a post-industrial city, to open up an industrial waterfront for public use, and to
create many new neighborhoods.  Unlike New York City, Barcelona’s planners recognized that these trans-
formations would “put environmental sustainability, functional efficacy, and the city’s social cohesion at
risk.”  Building on this recognition, they planned and implemented an Olympic redevelopment which
sought to combine economic innovation, sustainable urban development, and social cohesion.39
Closer to home, there are also a set of policy solutions which could help New York City do the same.
Housing advocates, community organizations, labor unions, business groups, environmental/environmen-
tal justice groups, and advocacy/smart growth planners around the country are experimenting with a series
37 NYC Department of Environmental Protection and US EPA, Green Building Design Competition for NYC, 2003.
38 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998).
39 Oriol Nel-Lo, Secretary of Planning for Catalonia, Spain and Professor of Geography, Autonomous University of
Barcelona, “Urban Dynamics, Public Policies and Governance in the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona,” 2004, avail-
able at http://www.scupad.org/download/2004_paper_o_nello.pdf. 
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of new tools.  Thus far, these initiatives – from inclusionary zoning to living wage ordinances to communi-
ty benefits agreements – have been viewed in isolation.40 We believe that, smartly applied and in combi-
nation, they could reshape proposed redevelopment plans to create more shared and sustainable prosper-
ity.  In our final section, we review some of these strategies and the potential they hold for remaking New
York City.
INCLUSIONARY ZONING
Inclusionary zoning (IZ) is a policy tool which, as Mayor Bloomberg has commented, works to “harness the
vitality of our housing market – turning the challenge of today’s high prices for market-rate units into an
opportunity to create low-priced homes as well.”41 IZ was pioneered in rapidly growing suburbs, but its
application has expanded rapidly over the last decade in “hot market” cities experiencing a housing rebirth.
IZ establishes either requirements or incentives for developers to include affordable housing for low and
moderate-income families in new market-rate developments.  Generally, developers receive density bonus-
es (i.e. they are allowed to build somewhat larger buildings) or other regulatory incentives (e.g. fee waivers).  
Inclusionary zoning has been adopted by hundreds of cities around the country (including Boston, San
Diego, San Francisco, and Chicago), and has led to the creation of thousands of units of affordable hous-
ing.  IZ creates mixed-income communities and enhances integration (unlike most affordable housing
development programs, which tend to concentrate low-income units in low-income neighborhoods).  
In the areas where rezoning is creating opportunities for substantially new housing development, we par-
ticularly support mandatory IZ, which requires developers to include some percentage of affordable hous-
ing.  Only through mandatory programs can the City capture the large private windfalls (in some cases as
much as 800%) that landowners are receiving as a result of rezonings.  Mandatory IZ programs have been
documented around the country not to have a negative impact on market-rate development – in studies by
PolicyLink, David Paul Rosen and Associates, the and Business and Professional People in the Public
Interest. 42 Mandatory IZ programs do tend to cause a slight moderation in land costs, which is exactly
what is needed for affordable housing to be created.  In addition, a base mandate for all developer in rezon-
ing areas will help the City stretch its financial incentive programs to create more units, which is critical
given the shortfall of affordable units.
ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR INDUSTRIAL JOB RETENTION
While New York’s economy is now predominantly post-industrial, we believe it is short-sighted for the
Bloomberg Administration to encourage boom and bust in the property market to displace tax-paying, job-
generating firms in the city’s remaining industrial enclaves. The industrial jobs which remain in NYC – after
40 The work of PolicyLink is a notable exception, where many of these tools have been brought together in an “equi-
table development toolkit.”
41 Mayor Michael Bloomberg, speech at Enterprise Foundation Network Conference, October 14, 2004.
42 See Rose, Lander, and Feng, Increasing Housing Opportunity in NYC, 2004, op cit.
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several decades of loss to lower-cost locations – have real reasons to be located here.  Many observers,
including an independent consultant hired by the New York City Economic Development Corporation,43
believe that by clearly stating a commitment to industry, by strengthening zoning enforcement and by
investing in areas intended for continuing industrial use and perhaps growth, City officials could strength-
en the city’s economy and preserve blue-collar jobs. Tools applied toward this end might include public
and non-profit development of low-cost industrial space, strategic capital and infrastructure investments in
industrial areas, and stronger enforcement of existing regulations against illegal conversions. They might
also include these specific zoning measures endorsed by the Zoning for Jobs coalition, staffed by the New
York Industrial Retention Network:
Industrial Employment Districts (IED) – From Planned Manufacturing Districts in Chicago to Industrial
Sanctuaries in Portland, planners in cities with burgeoning property markets have enacted zoning that
clarifies for residential and commercial developers (as well as industrial developers, realtors and ten-
ants) where government officials are serious about maintaining predominantly industrial land usage,
thus preventing inflated land prices and the “warehousing” of property. The IED, which would be super-
imposed on existing M1, M2 and/or M3 zones as an overlay district in New York, would provide trans-
parency and certainty to owners of industrially zoned property and create a stable climate for invest-
ment, employment retention and new job creation in areas whose location and industry mix makes
them desirable for continued industrial activity.
Balanced Mixed Use Districts – Some of New York City’s remaining industrial base is located in neigh-
borhoods that also contain substantial residential and commercial uses. For these neighborhoods, a
more nuanced industrial retention and development strategy is needed. The Balanced Mixed Use
District would be appropriate for currently M-zoned areas where more than 50% of the existing uses
are industrial but that are also characterized by a mix of other uses including residential, community
facility and/or commercial. An inventory of the percentage of total sq. ft. in manufacturing/industrial use
would be conducted prior to the mapping of such a district. Subsequently, when sponsors of new “as
of right” developments or conversions applied for certificates of occupancy, they would be required to
show that, with their project added, the percentage of square feet in the district in manufacturing/indus-
trial use would not drop below 50%.  
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
When public subsidy is supporting the private development of office, convention or entertainment space,
city officials should insist on the negotiation of community benefits agreements that offer local residents the
opportunity to share concretely in the value being generated. A “community benefits agreement,” several
of which have been successfully negotiated in California, outlines a set of benefits that a developer prom-
ises to provide as part of a project in exchange for community support (including affordable housing
options, living-wage jobs, first-source hiring for local residents, job training, community spaces within the
facilities, and environmental improvements). For the purpose of enforceability, these benefits are typically
43 See Parthenon Group 2003.
integrated into a development agreement between the developer and the city. Groups in New York City
have begun working to craft and pass a policy that would automatically trigger minimum standards, and
potentially a community benefits process, when developers benefit from large subsidy deals or significant
land use changes. 
LINKAGE FEES
In 1983, the city of Boston began a development “linkage program” in order to redirect some of the bene-
fits of downtown investment toward its neighborhoods.  Under the program, real estate developers seeking
approval of large scale commercial or institutional developments are required to make “linkage payments”
of $8.62 per square foot of construction over 100,000 square feet.  The payments – amortized over up to
12 years – are used by the City for affordable housing ($7.18 per/s.f.) and job training ($1.44 per/s.f.).  From
the inception of the linkage program through June 2000, $58.2 million has been awarded to various afford-
able housing projects, which allowed the construction or renovation of 5,979 housing units in 89 projects
in the City’s neighborhoods.  The job training component was initiated in 1998, and over the next four years
$11.9 million of funds had been committed and $8.2 million of funds have been awarded resulting in the
creation of 93 programs.  Services funded under this program include model program designs for entry-level
jobs training, school-to-work transition, family literacy, workplace-based education, private sector involve-
ment in the design and delivery of services, and capacity building in impacted communities.  The funds are
targeted to neighborhoods where development projects are located, and to programs which address the
specific needs of that community.
A BETTER WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
If New Yorkers who are currently low-skilled and low-waged or unemployed are to benefit from develop-
ment, one thing they need is a high-performing second chance workforce system that enables them to gain
basic and job-specific skills and helps put them on a path to career advancement. We recommend creat-
ing direct links between the workforce training system and the administration’s property-led economic
development strategy. 
New York City should encourage employers to train their incumbent workers, and to create career lad-
ders that offer entry-level workers the opportunity to move to better-paid positions through training they
receive on the job. They should be particularly aggressive about using this leverage in cases where city
subsidy is involved (see “Community Benefits Agreements” above).  
One possibility would be to work with developers to create on-site, multi-employer centers which cre-
ate opportunities for employees (e.g. at a large retail mall).  Such centers could include not only job
training and career counseling, but also financial literacy, outreach for the earned income tax credit,
etc.
City officials should funnel revenues from property development projects specifically to the city univer-
sity system, to ensure that students graduating from New York City high schools will have a chance at
an affordable college education that will enable them to qualify for newly generated service jobs.
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The City can develop better links between the second chance and “first chance” systems:  for example,
the Department of Education should focus on integrating workforce-related skills into curricula aimed
at high school students who are likely to complete their formal education with a high school diploma. 
MAKE SERVICE WORK PAY
As important as education and training are to labor market success in a post-industrial city, the fact remains
that changing returns to education explain only about a third of the total increase in economic inequality
in the United States over the past three decades. More than half of the income polarization observed dur-
ing this period has occurred within groups of workers of the same age, education and experience.44 It will
require more than an excellent education and training system to lift New York’s working poor families from
poverty. Many policy interventions designed to “make service work pay,” such as increasing the minimum
wage, making the Earned Income Tax Credit more generous, and reforming laws governing union organiz-
ing and collective bargaining, must be pursued at the state and federal level. But the City of New York can
also participate in the following ways:
Enforce the living wage ordinance passed by the City Council in 2002, which decrees that contractor
firms which receive funds to provide homecare, building, day care and other services under the City’s
auspices must pay their employees $8.60 per hour, plus an allowance for health benefits if the employ-
er does not provide health insurance. 
Extend the living-wage law beyond firms that do business with the city to firms that receive city eco-
nomic development subsidies.
Pass the Health Care Security Act, which requires employers in certain service industries where many
employers provide health care either to provide health care coverage to their employees or to pay the
City a fee to cover the health care costs of uninsured workers.
Implement an Earned Income Tax Credit applicable to taxable New York City earnings.
Publicly honor “high-road” employers with exemplary track records of investing in their workforces and
who focus on employee retention and productivity enhancement rather than cost-cutting.
Lend support the efforts of groups like the Taxi Workers Alliance and Domestic Workers United to prom-
ulgate industry standards in sectors where informal work arrangements are common.
44 See Annette Bernhardt et al. Divergent Paths: Economic Mobility in the New American Labor Market. Russell Sage
Foundation, 2001.
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PREVENT RESIDENTIAL DISPLACEMENT
Inclusionary zoning can leverage the creation of new market-rate units to produce new affordable units.
However, it does not generally address displacement of existing residents.  Because new development often
leads to secondary displacement, which prevents low and moderate income residents from taking advan-
tage of improved neighborhood quality of life, it is essential that the City seek strategies which allow resi-
dents – and especially low and moderate income tenants – to remain in their communities.  Some strate-
gies for preventing tenant displacement include:
Strengthen rent regulations, including seeking repeal of the Urstadt Law, which prevents New York City’s
citizens from choosing their own rent regulation policies.  Rent regulations do not cover new construc-
tion (unless landlords opt in, in exchange for a tax break), so it does not dampen new development.
Instead, rent regulations (which are adjusted annually to reflect economic conditions, and generally
exceed cost inflation) are the primary policy which enables moderate-income tenants to remain in their
housing as neighborhoods improve and prices rise.
Give small homeowners a modest tax break if they retain low and moderate income tenants at below-
market rents as market prices increase.  One unacknowledged stock of affordable housing in New York
is the tens of thousands of below-market units in 1-4 family homes, where owners retain long-time ten-
ants even as prices rise.  A modest incentive to keep these tenants in place has been proposed by the
Fifth Avenue Committee and the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (Community
Stability Tax Credit) and the New York City Council (the Good Neighbor Tax Credit).
Enhance efforts to preserve affordable housing with expiring affordability restrictions as subsidy terms
expire.  Several efforts are underway to give tenants a better change of staying in their housing, and in
some cases of purchasing their building, when restrictions expire and landlords seek to increase the rent
roll.  
INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND RETROFIT BUILDINGS TO PROMOTE A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Rather than invest almost exclusively in new buildings – which lead to an increasing demand for energy
and an increase outflow of waste – we should also invest in strategies that can reduce waste and pollution,
generate energy more efficiently, and still create tens of thousands of jobs.  Several possibilities for smart,
targeted investment that could be both environmentally conscious and economically savvy:
The Cross Harbor Rail Freight Tunnel and affiliated system enhancements can help to take millions of
vehicle miles of freight truck travel off of the region’s streets each year.  Over time, the movement of
goods would become not only less polluting (on trains, rather than trucks), but more economically effi-
cient as well.
Create incentives to retrofit buildings to make them more energy efficient.
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Invest in renewable energy technologies, and in products that are based either in NYC’s waste stream,
or in serving more sustainable building construction.
Take steps toward a “zero waste” economy, by utilizing labor-intensive strategies for waste reduction.
INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE TO IMPROVE LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY OF LIFE
The City’s investments in the West Side alone will – by its own estimation (which has been declared low by
several independent groups) – exceed $5 billion.  City expenditures in Lower Manhattan, downtown
Brooklyn, Brooklyn Atlantic Yards, and other key development sites will total billions more.  Many of these
investments are in public transportation and open space which will create a more livable and sustainable
city.  Unfortunately, these benefits will accrue primarily to higher-income individuals who live or work in
the targeted areas.  If New York City wins the 2012 Olympic Games, additional athletic facilities, open
space, and transportation investments will be made in a wider range of communities.  However, these
expenditures are not based on an analysis of community need, but on the logistics of holding an Olympic
Games. 
With or without the Olympics (although a high level of infrastructure investment will surely be easier with
the Games), there are opportunities to adjust these plans to do better to meet local needs.  While Queens
will benefit from new athletic facilities, the public construction that its immigrant communities need most
is new schools to address high levels of overcrowding.  Can Olympic construction be adjusted to build
those schools?  
In other communities, which are not part of the Olympic plans, modest investments in neighborhood qual-
ity of life could make a substantial difference in making working-class communities better places to live.
For example, a 2002 study by the Citizens Housing and Planning Council, Revitalizing from Within:
Reviving New York’s Neglected Neighborhoods, suggests a series of ways in which modest urban design and
infrastructure investments could make a substantial difference in Greenpoint, Woodside, and Fordham-
Bedford.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that market forces, particularly the powerful currents of the global information economy and the
regional real estate market, are reconfiguring New York City. Public officials are right to respond with
attempts to shape development in the city’s interest. What is less clear is that the city’s interest is served
when planning and policy function primarily to reinforce and exacerbate market-generated inequities. 
By taking an active role in shaping the future landscape of New York City, the Bloomberg Administration is
acknowledging that government has a constructive role to play in the global city’s economy.  We affirm this
and suggest that such a role should be expanded to include more than “oiling the machinery” for growth.
Instead, city officials should take opportunities to leverage government regulatory and financial power on
behalf of those whose interests are least well-served by markets.
Scholar James Throgmorton has described urban planning as “persuasive story-telling about the future,”45
underlining the extent to which planners do not simply convert neutral information into interventions on
the landscape but rather, in both the generation and application of knowledge, weave distinct, future-ori-
ented visions for cities and for the societies which contain and support them. Just as Daniel Burnham’s
Chicago plan of 1909 was about the redemption of the 19th century industrial city via government reform
and neo-classical architecture, today’s city plans are narratives about what built forms, economic strategies,
governance structures and civic cultures are desirable and sustainable in the post-industrial cities of the
21st.  The development projects proposed by the Bloomberg Administration amount to such a comprehen-
sive plan – a strategy for the physical and economic transformation of the five boroughs of New York City
over the next three decades. 
Our critique of the City’s far-reaching plans for up-zonings, down-zonings, and new development projects
across the five boroughs is based not on opposition to development, but on the premise that its benefits –
and its costs – should be more evenly shared among the people of the city. Our strategy for growth with
equity is grounded in the conviction that new tools such as inclusionary zoning, community benefits agree-
ments and measures to “make service work pay” can realize greater equity without smothering economic
growth. We look forward to ongoing dialogue with the administration about how to reshape proposed rede-
velopment plans to create more shared and sustainable prosperity in New York City.
45 James A. Throgmorton 1992, “Planning as persuasive storytelling about the future: negotiating an electric power
rate settlement in Illinois.” Journal of Planning Education and Research. 12(1):17-31.
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